International Gramsci Journal
Volume 2
Issue 2 Gramsci on factory councils / Gramsci in
today’s world

Article 7

2017

The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil: a Reading
from Some Reflections of Gramsci
Giovanni Semeraro

Follow this and additional works at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci
Recommended Citation
Semeraro, Giovanni, The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil: a Reading from Some Reflections of
Gramsci, International Gramsci Journal, 2(2), 2017, 89-106.
Available at:http://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol2/iss2/7
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil: a Reading from Some Reflections
of Gramsci
Abstract

The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil: a Reading from Some Reflections of Gramsci
Abstract
Since the nineteen sixties, Gramsci has been one of the main authors inspiring the renewal of Marxism, the
resistance of popular movements to the military dictatorship, and the formation of political organizations in
the process of democratization in Brazil. Various of his categories, such as “passive revolution”, “transformism”,
the “expanded State”, “war of movement/war of position”, “national-popular”, “hegemony” etc., have often
served as a basis for interpreting the history and politics of Brazil. But, in his writings there is also a set of
reflections that depict situations which are much closer to the economic and political crisis currently affecting
Brazil. Among other aspects, in fact, Gramsci’s work, written between the two great wars of the last century, is
characterized by the analysis of the “organic crisis” of bourgeois society, by the search for the reasons of the
defeat of the revolutionary movement, and by the new possibilities opened to the “subaltern classes” in crucial
historical circumstances. In the light of this background, in these few pages we will discuss the current political
situation of Brazil taking into account especially the Observations on Certain Aspects of the Structure of Political
Parties in Periods of Organic Crisis (Q13, § 23, pp. 1602-1613; SPN, pp. 210-218 and concluding part on pp.
167-168) and on the modern forms of Caesarism (Q13, § 27, pp. 1619-1622; SPN, pp. 219-222)*.
* Gramsci, A., Quaderni del carcere, ed. V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975. In the body of the text, this edition
is quoted as QC, followed by the number of the notebook, the number of the paragraph (where necessary also
the sub-paragraph) and page of the Italian edition, data which allow quotations to be located in the Brazilian
and other integral editions. Page references are also given to English translations (SPN for Gramsci 1971; PN,
vols. I, II and III for Gramsci 1992, 1996 and 2007 respectively; and FSPN for Gramsci 1995).
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The Economic-Political Crisis in Brazil:
a Reading from Some Reflections of Gramsci
Giovanni Semeraro
1. The end of a political cycle
In June 2013, on the eve of the Confederations Cup, huge
demonstrations broke out in Brazil occupying squares and streets in
over 300 cities and uncovering the deep crisis latent in the country.
On posters, slogans and in the symbology used, demonstrators
expressed their anger at the reduction in the country’s growth rate
and at basic demands never being met, while large investments were
made in overpriced projects to ensure the world that the football
extravaganza orchestrated by FIFA (Fédération Internationale de
Football Association) would actually take place. Triggered by social
networks in a ‘spontaneous’ and apparently chaotic way, those mass
mobilizations, expressing various forms of dissent, claimed the ‘Fifa
standard’ for public services and protested against corruption,
precarious work and the loss of purchasing power. The sudden
explosion, which drew into its vortex a multiplicity of even
opposing interests and a mix of social groups, was, in fact, the
expression of “a whole series of questions which [had] piled up in a
molecular form” (QC 15, § 59, p. 1824; SPN, p. 106)1 in a country
whose government no longer represented an aggregating and
consensual project. A very similar picture is portrayed by Gramsci
when he describes aspects of the “organic crisis” which occurs
1) because the previously passive great masses went into motion, but it was
chaotic, disorganized motion, without leadership, that is, without a precise
collective political will; 2) because […] the middle classes […] found
themselves unemployed, precisely after having completed their apprenticeship
in positions of authority etc.; 3) because the antagonistic forces turned out to
be incapable of organizing the actual disorder to their advantage (QC 7, § 80,
pp. 912-913; PN, Vol. III, p. 211).

1

The SPN translation is modified to take account of the importance that “molecularly” has
attained in Gramsci and Gramscian studies [editorial note].
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Taken by surprise and stunned, authorities sought to circumvent
popular revolt, at first with repression but later metabolizing a few
demands with palliative measures and generic promises of reform.
Without seeing any real effect, pressures started up again after the
2014 elections. Since the end of 2014, in fact, when Dilma
Rousseff, from the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT),
was re-elected President of the Republic with a very slim majority
of the popular vote, society clearly revealed its division and people
slowly began to realize the gravity of the crisis that had hit Brazil.
The dramatic economic and political situation was compounded by
the numerous cases of corruption revealed by “Operation Car
Wash” (Operação Lava-Jato), triggered by the Federal Police and the
Public Ministry when they discovered a ‘kickback’ scheme in
Petrobras, a strategic state-owned company due to its high earnings
and investments.
An impressive list of politicians of various parties (including
ministers and chairmen of the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate) and of government officials, bribed by major construction
companies and private firms, shocked the population, putting on
display not only the climate of impunity prevailing in the country
and the frightening hole in the government’s coffers, but, above all,
the predatory culture that rages in many sectors of society and the
lack of an effective democracy on account of the strength of large
economic groups. In the same period, “Operation Zelotes”,
promoted by the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service (Receita Federal),
the Federal Police, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and the
Internal Affairs Office of the Ministry of Treasury, unveiled a tax
evasion scheme which initially amounted to over 20 billion
Brazilian real (in round terms now between 5 and 6 billion euros or
US dollars), defrauded at the Administrative Tax Appeals Council
(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais – CARF), where reduction
services were sold or the debt of banks and large companies (such
as, for example, Santander, Bradesco, Gerdau, RBS – affiliate of
Rede Globo etc) disappeared. In addition to this, Wikileaks disclosed
information on secret accounts in the Swiss branch of HSBC Bank,
which included the names of 8667 Brazilians, alleged to have stolen
considerable amounts from the country in undeclared currency.
The PT, involved in corruption scandals, won a fourth term with
the aid of much electoral juggling, but saw this result become a
90
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“Pyrrhic victory”. To ensure a minimum of governability, in fact,
the government of the President was required to set up a harsh
fiscal adjustment, completely contradicting its campaign promises,
and to make huge concessions to the allied parties, most of which
had positions totally against its program. In this way, with the
Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the hands
of the PMDB (now numerically the largest party), the basis of the
parliamentary support started to vote opportunistic and reactionary
guidelines, which further deepened the crisis that was devastating
the country. But, the greatest disaster suffered by the PT has been
the loss of credibility in the larger sectors of society, the dropout of
many militants, popular organizations and intellectuals frustrated by
the lack of consistency and distortion of the party. For somewhat
more than a couple of years, then, it has not constituted a
hegemonic force in the country capable of aggregating consent,
giving unity and political direction to the nation, a situation which
has therefore led to the creation of a dangerous vacuum that
generates uncertainty, social disarray and rise of adventurists and
predators. Taking advantage of the “crisis of command and
leadership when spontaneous consent undergoes a crisis” (QC 4, §
49, p. 476; PN Vol. II, p. 201), the massive advances of financial
capital, business and the right-wing media – upset by the fourth
defeat in elections and by social spending, launched relentless
attacks in order to disqualify the PT and (successfully) demand the
resignation and impeachment of now ex-President Rousseff. After
having taken this risky path, which may be considered as
representing one of institutional rupture and a “white coup”, the
opposition forces continued to make the PT-led government bleed
by imposing a harsh neoliberal agenda on it, with the intention of
paving the way for an overwhelming victory in the next elections,
the recent municipal ones of autumn 2016, and in the state and
national elections, in 2018.
It is also to be noted that, in recent years, the situation in Brazil
has been worsening due to the long period of drought which has
affected agriculture and the water system of strategic regions, in
addition to a set of external factors, such as the world economic
crisis, protectionism practiced by the United States and the
European Union, the reduction of growth in China and Russia and
the disintegration of trading partners in the Middle East and Africa.
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To these ingredients one must add the contraction of leftist parties
that is occurring around the world and the wearing down of
progressive governments in Latin America, articulated around
projects such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA and
contrary to the interests of the United States. Although significant,
however, these factors do not exempt the PT from responsibilities
regarding mistakes in political strategy and economy management,
accommodation, omission, engagement in acts of corruption and
the apparatus of the State conducted by it. A political agglutination
that has marked the history of Brazil over the last 35 years, which
now can no longer “[…] really causes the whole society to move
forward, not merely satisfying its own existential requirements, but
continuously augmenting its cadres for the conquest of every new
sphere of economic and productive activity” (QC 19, § 24, p. 2012;
SPN, p. 60). In this way, if the bureaucracy “feels itself independent
of the mass of members, the party ends up by becoming
anachronistic and at moments of acute crisis it is voided of its social
content and left as though suspended in mid-air” (QC 13, § 23, p.
1604; SPN, p. 211). Today, in fact, it is practically unanimous to
consider that the cycle of the PT, dominated by corporatism and
entrenched in the remnants of governmental power, is heading
towards decline because it lost the ability to create an “[…] organic
unity between theory and practice, between intellectual strata and
popular masses, between rulers and ruled” (QC 13, § 36, p. 1635,
SPN, p. 190). In 1930, in the fascist prison, Gramsci warned that
Ignoring and, even worse, disdaining the so-called ‘spontaneous’
movements – that is declining to give them a conscious leadership and raise
them to a higher level by inserting them into politics – may often have very
bad and serious consequences. It is almost always the case that a ‘spontaneous’
movement of the subaltern classes is matched by a reactionary movement of
the right wing of the dominant class, for concomitant reasons: an economic
crisis, for example, produces, on the one hand, discontent among the subaltern
classes and spontaneous mass movements and, on the other, conspiracies by
reactionary groups, who take advantage of the objective enfeeblement of the
government to attempt coups d’état. Among the efficient causes of these
coups d’état, one must include the failure of the responsible groups to give
conscious leadership to the spontaneous rebellions and thus enable them to
become a positive political factor. (QC 3, § 48, p. 331; PN, Vol. II, p. 51;
alternative wording in SPN, p. 199).
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After 2003, when it won the Presidency of the Republic and the
government of important cities and states of the country, the PT
started to consolidate itself in power thanks to a favourable external
economic environment and to the social programs that ensured its
popular support. Even in the years of the major crisis that exploded
in the world in 2008, countercyclical internal measures managed to
avoid the erosion of wages and jobs. But, throughout its mandates,
the party, which from its formation had been noted for its “new
way of doing politics”, and for a unique process of popular
participation, gradually lost these features, took it easy and adopted
ambiguous positions. In fact, leading a contradictory
administration, it sought to promote the public by favouring private
interests; multiplied paternalistic policies and at the same time made
the élite richer and facilitated huge profits for banks; boosted the
primary exporter sector with a large production of commodities at
the cost of a high degree of pollution and intensive use of
pesticides; appeased the misery of the most abandoned sectors with
“bolsas” programs, raised the minimum wage, opened credit lines
and access to the university. It did not however reduce inequality
since it avoided substantial transformations, namely agrarian and
urban reforms, fiscal and political reforms, audit of the government
debt and of the financial system, media democratization and fair
distribution of the wealth produced collectively. Without fighting
the mechanisms that reproduce the concentration of wealth and
without promoting an “intellectual and moral reform” of the
popular classes such as to place them in a position to exercise their
sovereignty, it is not possible to reach an effectively fair and
democratic society.
The sovereignty of a country, in fact, consists not only in fighting
poverty, in increasing production and in having citizens functional
to the system, but depends essentially on the promotion of selfgovernment and the socialization of politics and common assets –
the most fundamental of all rights – without which a people cannot
be a free and respectable subject. This is the deepest sense that
Gramsci gives to democracy when he defines it as the system that
must promote the transition of citizens from their condition of
ruled to rulers, from the position of governed to governors (QC 8, §
191, p. 1056; PN, Vol. III, p. 345).
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When it became reconciled to social and economic groups with
no national-popular commitment and promoted developmental
projects to achieve “what is possible within the capitalist model”
(Boito, 2012), the PT administration continued to allow the
concentration of wealth and land in the hands of a few, to
indiscriminately throw the doors open for investors and imports,
and somewhat strangely, to increase the debt on its checking
account due to an absurd primary surplus that set stratospheric
interest rates and introduced one of the most perverse mechanisms
of transfer of income from labor to financial speculation.
Indeed, both the conciliatory government of Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva (2003-2010) and the managerial centralism of Dilma Vana
Rousseff (2011-2016), which even tried (unsuccessfully) to reduce
interest rates and bank profits (Singer, 2015, pp. 47 et seq.), gave in
to the typical formula of “class coexistence”, which does not
compromise the socio-economic structure, and to the
“miscegenation” of the politics that characterizes the history of
Brazil. This is a phenomenon that the leading sociologist Francisco
de Oliveira portrays as the production of a “platypus” (the
“ornitorrinco” of Oliveira’s 2003 volume) since it seeks to combine
savage capitalism with paternalistic social benefits, ensures the
controlled reproduction of inequality and naturalizes the
contradictions of a “left which governs with its right hand”.
However, to reach governmental power with the popular vote and
then to continue to reproduce the current system is fatal to the left.
In this sense, “Lulism” (Singer, 2012) and the transformation of its
government in a state-Bonapartist party (cf. QC 3, § 119, p. 387;
PN, Vol. II. pp. 105-106) led to a separation between political
society and civil society, a demobilization of the popular
movements and to an “illusory conciliation” of antagonistic
interests rather than to a “passive revolution in the Brazilian way”.
Gramsci, in fact, even when he acknowledges the occurrence of
“molecular changes” or “modifications” (QC 15, § 11, 1767; SPN,
p. 109) and of “relatively ‘progressive’” elements (QC, 14, §23;
SPN, p. 223) in processes of “passive revolution”, leaves no doubt
when he refers to the attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Such
tests, indeed, are
non-organic creations, because they are contradictory, because they are
intended to reconcile opposed and contradictory interests; their ‘historicicity’
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will be brief because contradiction appears after each event of which they have
been the instrument. The philosophy of praxis, on the other hand, does not
aim at the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions in history and society
but is rather the very theory of these contradictions. It is not the instrument of
government of the dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and
exercise hegemony over the subaltern classes; it is the expression of these
subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and
have an interest in knowing all truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in
avoiding the (impossible) deceptions of the upper class and – even more –
their own (QC 10, Part II, § 41XII, p. 1319-1320; FSPN, pp. 395-396).

An alert in this direction had been released by, among others,
Carlos Nelson Coutinho when, in 1999, in view of the ongoing
crisis, he called attention to the difference between “social
democratic reformism” tamed by the established order and
a reformist-revolutionary strategy that will maintain the overcoming of
capitalism as an objective, devising socialism as the ultimate goal of a historic era
marked by profound and progressive structural reforms (Coutinho, 2000, p.
116).

2. Reasons for the crisis
Regardless of the analysis that will be drawn from the PT
government, the fact is that Brazil which, between 2004 and 2012
showed an annual growth rate of 5% asserting itself as the fifth
world economy, is now facing a bitter recession of 3%, an inflation
rate of 10%, an unemployment rate that rose from 9% to 11.9%
(year-end to year-end 2015-2016), a currency devaluation of over
50% against the dollar and the closure of many industries, which
has led to disastrous consequences for the population previously
animated by the hopes of a reduction of poverty and of better
living conditions. The situation in Brazil has become even more
dramatic as, on the one hand, we see the exhaustion of the political
hegemony of the PT and, on the other hand, it seems that there is
no other political power or leadership able to promote “the fusion
of an entire social group under a single leadership, which alone is
held to be capable of solving an over-riding problem of its
existence and fending off a mortal danger” (QC 13, § 23, p. 1604;

95

International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017

SPN, p. 211).2 Thus, while in the population disbelief in politics and
disappointment with regard to the parties has been spreading, “[…]
the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum,
morbid phenomena the most varied kind occur” (QC 3, § 34, p.
311; PN Vol. II, p. 33). This represents a more dangerous situation,
as Gramsci notes in Notebook 4 (in a so-called “A” text, i.e. a first
draft, of 1930), since
it spreads to all the political parties and among all the different classes; […].
The crisis is dangerous when the rank and file of one or more parties does not
go over very quickly to another party that better epitomizes the general
interest. (QC 4, § 69, p. 513; PN, Vol. II, p. 241).

A few years later, in the second draft (a “C” text) recorded in one
of the “special” notebooks (Q 13, § 23: 1932-1934),3 as though he
were describing the situation underway in Brazil, Gramsci remarks
that
At a certain point in their historical lives, social groups become detached
from their traditional parties. In other words, the traditional parties, in that
particular organisational form, with the particular men who constitute,
represent and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of
a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation
becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions,
for the activities of unknown forces represented charismatic “men of destiny”
[…]. In every country the process is different, although the content is the
same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony,

unable as it is, to meet the expectations of the popular masses
which
put forward demands which taken altogether, albeit not organically
formulated, add up to a revolution (QC, § 13, pp. 1602-1603; SPN, p. 210).

The disaggregation of a party that has catalysed the country’s
renewal and has united much of the popular movements over the
last few decades, along with the uneasiness also observed in many
2

Here again the translation is brought into line with the QC original by substituting
“group” for SPN’s “class” [editorial note].
3
The dating of Notebook 13 is notoriously difficult; even Gianni Francioni, editor of the
anastatic version of the Notebooks (Gramsci 2009, Vol. 14, p. 154), has been unable to date its
paragraphs to more exactly than mid-1932 to November 1933 [editorial note].
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union organizations associated with the allied United Workers’
Center (Central Única dos Trabalhadores – CUT), has been skilfully
exploited by conservative forces to unleash a new offensive of
capital aimed at enlarging the regime of precariousness and
increasing outsourcing and cuts in public services. In this way, if in
the past decade, in the reflux of neoliberal policies in Latin
America, the PT was useful to the interests of the bourgeoisie to
control the growing wave of popular mobilizations, now, the
economic crisis, which has been weakening the party, has become
the best excuse to get rid of a party whose organization and
continuity, even with its ambiguities, represents a threat and a
burden to the free action of the economic power and to the
advancement of a reactionary wave in Brazil and in Latin America.
In this very delicate and unpredictable process,
[t]he crisis creates situations which are dangerous in the short run, since the
various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting themselves
equally swiftly. The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres,
changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the
subaltern classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp” (QC
13, § 23, p. 1603; SPN, p. 210).

And in fact, what is going on in Brazil is not exactly a power
vacuum as many analysts argue, because a vacuum does not exist,
much less in politics. Representatives of finance capital, of
international corporations and large companies, federations of
industry and commerce and the corporate media, with their poses
as scholars and saviours, started to directly occupy key posts in the
government (Treasury, Planning, Agriculture, Mines and Energy,
Industry and Trade, Science and Technology, Health etc.) and to
impose a fiscal adjustment aimed at ensuring that the primary
surplus was intended to pay bankers and speculators in public debt
securities, to downgrade salaries, to relax the Consolidation of
Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho – CLT), to
commercialize social rights and to install a ‘minimum State’.
Although every country and every historical circumstance show
different processes, we can also find precious elements to better
understand what has been taking place in Brazil in Gramsci’s
reflections on “Caesarism”, a phenomenon which can be said to
“express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each
97
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other in a catastrophic manner” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1619; SPN, p. 219)
and cancel each other, giving rise to a situation of ‘ungovernability’
that paves the way for an “solution by ‘arbitrage’” (loc. cit.),4 by the
intervention of technicians and professionals from large financial
institutions specialized in ‘cleaning up’, and which are ‘free’ of
ideological influences – as if it were possible to separate economy
from politics. Currently, indeed, the developmental project has no
political and social forces strong enough on which to support itself,
but the ‘adjustment’ policies are also meeting with resistance in
society. This lack of definition, in which “no group, neither the
conservatives nor the progressives, has the strength for victory”
(QC 13, § 23, p. 1604; SPN, p. 211), and the lack of an alternative
political pole, favor the growth of a particular form of “Caesarism”
in Brazil. The need to implement ‘urgent’ measures of austerity that
could put the country ‘back on track’ has created a ‘state of
exception’ situation, enabling the approval of regressive projects,
paralyzing political action and putting the population in a painful
standby position. Moving away from “the assessment made by
Marx in his celebrated 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (Liguori, 2009,
p. 124), as well as the classic examples of “Caesarism” manifested in
the figures of Caesar and Napoleon (“progressive” Caesarism) or of
Napoleon III and Bismarck (“reactionary Caesarism”), Gramsci
notes that “In the modern world, with its great economic-tradeunion and party-political coalitions, the mechanism of the Caesarist
phenomenon is different from what it was up to Napoleon III”
(QC 9, § 133, p. 1195),5 since
a Caesarist solution can also exist without a Caesar, without any great
‘heroic’ and representative personality. The parliamentary system has also
provided a mechanism for such compromise solutions. […] Every coalition
government is a first stage of Caesarism, which either may or may not develop
to more significant stages (the common opinion of course is that coalition
governments, on the contrary, are the most ‘solid bulwark’ against Caesarism)
(QC 13, § 27, pp. 1619-1620; SPN, p. 220).

4

We here substitute “solution by arbitrage” in an attempt to come closer to Gramsci’s
“soluzione ‘arbitrale’” than SPN’s “particular solution” [editorial note].
5
Cf. the rewritten “C” text of Q 13, §23 (SPN p. 220), whose only modification is not to
include the word “very” before “different”, present instead in the “A” text [editorial note].

98

International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017

And in fact, since the PT formed a coalition government with
the conservative forces, it ended up creating an amalgam between
contrasting “forces which could in the last analysis fuse and unify,
albeit after a wearying and bloody process” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1622;
SPN, p. 222). But, this ambiguous game that has been taking place
between apparently “contrasting” parties does not hide a deeper
reality that is a concern in Brazilian politics. Due to bribes and
generous campaign fundings, passed on by large companies, in
addition to the lobbying of powerful economic groups and the
pressures of the monopolized media, parliamentarians undertake
responsibilities with an autocratic and undemocratic power that
bypasses the voters’ choice, manipulates the Congress and public
institutions, empties democracy and subdues national sovereignty,
thus giving way to a ‘camouflaged Caesarism’ consolidated in
periods of the fragility and mutual destruction of conflicting
political groups. Gramsci adds that the activity of this “modern
Caesarism” does not need to resort to the army or to brute force,
since “The functionaries of the parties and economic unions can be
corrupted or terrorised, without any need for military action in the
grand style – of the Caesar or 18 Brumaire type” (QC, 13 § 27, p.
1620; SPN, p. 220). Thus, using powerful means of persuasion and
a sophisticated technological arsenal, Gramsci notes, “[…] modern
Caesarism is more a police than a military system” (QC, 13 § 27, p.
1622; SPN, p. 222), meaning that it is “[…] police in a broad
sense”, i.e., “[…] not only in the state service directed to the
repression of crime, but in the ensemble of organised state and
private forces to protect the political and economic dominion of
the ruling class” (p. 1620). The strategy of this “modern
Caesarism”, made of plots and espionage, of boycotts and embargo,
of economic blackmail and investor flight, of smear campaigns and
of criminalization of the ‘enemy’, is the most widely used mode in
our time to disable the socializing and democratic potential of
popular movements, to destabilize ‘unreliable’ governments and to
pave the way to the invasion and destruction of whole countries
(Losurdo, 2014, pp. 71-76).
As we all know, in the history of Brazil, except for brief
parentheses of democratic periods, the power conducted ‘from
outside and from above’ has always been present. Today, giving
continuity to this tradition and imposing themselves as the
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dominant components, there are the financial system, market
savagery and media monopoly, which conduct the destinies of the
country in a “Caesarist” way. Although not seen directly, this
unquestionable power establishes prices, interest rates and currency
value, determines the type of production, of commerce, of
urbanization, of social services and benefits, deforests and
concentrates huge tracts of land, freely syphons off the country’s
foreign currency, bribes politicians, kills with impunity Indians,
Blacks and poor people in the slums, builds a powerful ideological
apparatus, installs an extensive private network of schools and
universities, favours the dissemination of narcotizing churches and
the diffusion of a stupid and empty culture.
People who think this an exaggerated picture of the situation
ignore that, in the composition of the National Congress, large
landowners, industrialists, the great businessmen, evangelicals and
“the bullet bench” predominate. A framework that has driven the
experienced Congressman Ivan Valente to state that “What we
have there [in the Legislative] today is an apparatus, which I would
say is almost of the mafia-type” (Valente, 2015, p. 21). Shielded in
the distant Central Plateau, similar to economic and business offices
in their modern castles, the island of ‘the representatives of the
people’ has become a kind of ‘big brother’ television show, far from
national reality, impervious to national protests and strikes,
refractory to debate and to popular consultation and in a situation
of visible “decomposition” [of parliamentarianism] (QC 4, § 22,
442; PN Vol. II, p. 162). To remain in the government at any cost,
the PT had to adjust and make big concessions to this system,
creating programs that blend social assistance with neoliberalism,
leading the party to progressively drawing away from popular
aspirations and from the creation of a new project for society.
Following the path of permeable and reformist centre-left parties in
Europe, which try to survive by meekly managing capitalism, the
PT started to abandon its distinctive stance. It did not realize that
the action of confronting the insidious forms of Caesarism used by
capitalism in today’s world is far different from the actions of
resistance to military dictatorship. The current form of domination,
which is particularly engendered in the impenetrable intricacies of
the financial system and in the charms of the media, is more subtle
and seductive and, at the same time, is highly corrosive and
100
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totalizing. The rise of this “soft Caesarism” (Losurdo, 1993, p. 284),
as a matter of fact, has not been taking place only in the economic
sphere, in the State apparatus and in the media, but is also
progressing to privatizating public services, to anaesthetizing
consciences, and is even stealing the scene of the popular
movements themselves when it mobilizes significant social groups
on the streets. That is what has been going on, for example, with
the movement “Come into the Street” (Vem para a Rua) and
“Students for Freedom” (Estudantes pela Liberdade – EPL – founded
in 2012 and inspired by the “Students for Liberty” of the United
States), which gave way to “Free Brazil Movement” (Movimento
Brasil Livre – MBL), organizations funded by the Koch Brothers
and the ATLAS Economic Research Foundation, aimed at training
young Latin Americans to combat “left” governments and defend
old stances in new languages (Brasil de Fato, 2015, pp. 4-5). As Marx
had observed, capitalism does not focus only on economic
structures, but also determines the model of social relations, the
process of subjectivity production and the diffusion of common
sense, since, as observed above, “the class which has the means for
material production has, at the same time, the means for intellectual
production” (Marx-Engels, 1998, p. 48).6 We can therefore
understand Gramsci’s insistence on conducting “a study of how the
ideological structure of a ruling class is actually organized: that is,
the material organization meant to preserve, defend, and develop
the theoretical or ideological ‘front’” (QC 3, § 49, p. 332-3; PN Vol.
II, p. 52). A much more urgent need in a country like Brazil –
where the imposing power of newspapers, magazines, television
networks, churches, schools and civil society organizations are in
the hands of the ruling class and of international capital – makes
this domain practically absolute.
3. New possibilities for popular forces
Thirty years after the end of the dictatorship, Brazil is now facing
one of the most crucial crises in its short democratic history. What
appears in the media and in common sense is the call for ‘ethical
6

This is a literal rendering of the Brazilian translation of Die deutsche Ideologie; the standard
English translation reads “the class which has the means of material production at its disposal,
consequently also controls the means of mental production” (Marx-Engels 1976, p. 59).
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values’ and the need for a redeemer ‘car wash’ cleaning to conquer
the ‘cancer’ of corruption. This is a commendable operation,
without doubt, which is finally reaching some exponents in the
higher spheres and demonstrating a certain stability of the
investigative and judicial institutions. But, behind this narrative,
what really lies at the heart of the crisis is the impasse between
ineffective and obsolete projects of society and the lack of new
political forces to form a “historical bloc” able to galvanize the
country around “will as operative awareness of historical necessity,
as protagonist of a real and effective historical drama” (QC 13, § 1,
p. 1559; SPN, p. 130). Both populist development and the
reactionary Caesarism of economic groups are unable to promote
the expansion of democracy and respond to the growing ‘historical
needs’ of the masses. If the first project is eluded when it aims at
reducing misery without breaking with capitalism and the
mechanisms of inequality, the other repeats old formulas that lead
to retrocession and exclusion. While much energy is consumed in
the bonfire of ‘small-time politics’ and eroded parties, the crisis is
exposing the fracture of a country that is still economically, socially
and politically divided, split between the “panelaço”— in which
people protest by banging on empty pots — of the middle/upper
classes which feel threatened in their earnings and privileges and the
fear of classes C and D consumed by anguish as they see the
prospects for better living conditions moving away from them.
Although we cannot deny that the PT Government provided a
number of benefits for these lower classes, the framework of an
underdeveloped and unequal country has not changed substantially.
The permanence of the PT in power led many to think that the
changes would occur naturally and gradually, a naïve belief that
subdued the combativeness of the popular organizations and left
the path clear for the growing expansion of private powers, the
financial aristocracy, transnational companies, cartels, of a
tremendous parallel power that has been spreading to all sectors
without any obstacle. So, while the patronizing Bonapartism of
‘peace and love Lulism’ favored political disarmament and a
‘peaceful’ coexistence between classes, the “Caesarism” without
scruple of big capital found a fertile ground to reorganize and
strengthen itself. In no other period in the history of Brazil have the
profits of banks and rentiers grown so fast and the empire of the
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media and private business thriven so prodigiously, while the
“phenomenon of transformism’ introduced by Lulism produced a
scarcity of statesmen and government leaders, impoverishment of
parliamentary life [...] hence impoverishment of cultural life […]. The
universities and all the institutions that developed intellectual and technical
skills were impervious to the life of the parties and the living reality of national
life, and they created apolitical national cadres, with a purely rhetorical and
non-national mental formation (QC 3, § 119, pp. 387-388; PN Vol. II, p. 106).

In addition to revealing how illusory it is within capitalism to
construct a government in which everyone wins, the current crisis is
showing that the antagonism between classes “is historically
incurable and indeed becomes especially acute with the advent of
Caesarist forms” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1622; SPN, p. 222). These forms
make it clear who is “[…] the sovereign that decides on the state of
exception” (Schmitt, 1972, p. 33; Agamben, 2003) and that “[i]n a
capitalist society no one governs without entrepreneurs. They have
a right of veto over the country” (Bresser-Pereira, 2014). In these
conditions, therefore, there is no possibility of pushing democracy
beyond ‘certain limits’ because, in practice, real powers act without
the consent of democracy and nullify popular sovereignty
(Semeraro, 2014, pp. 195 et seq.).
As suggested by the etymology of the word, crisis means insight,
choice, decision to be taken when facing impasses and crossroads.
In the crucial period Brazil is living now, the ability to discern and
reorganize quickly can open paths to boost reactionary forces or to
develop social and political movements able to break away from the
current system and create a favourable condition for “an
unprecedented expansion of historical materialism” (QC 3, § 34, p.
311; PN Vol. II, p. 33). For Gramsci, in fact, “the crisis is the place
of ambivalence. Of instability, conflicts and of quite powerful
progressive dynamics” (Burgio 2007, p. 44). And, even in situations
of impasses and serious danger, Gramsci notes that “in the
movement of history there is never any turning back, and that
restorations in toto do not exist” (QC 13, § 27, p. 1619; SPN, pp.
219-220) because history remains “dialectical” (cf. QC 15, § 62, p.
1827; SPN, p. 114) and “despite all appearances” its field is left
open to the action of groups which know how to act politically and
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can organize themselves to dispute hegemony (cf. QC 6, § 138, p.
802; SPN, p. 239).
In this way, if after the military dictatorship the main objective
was to establish the democratic rule of law, to ensure civil and
political liberties, now, in even more adverse times (due to the
reigning climate of dystopia, disappointment and disorientation), in
order not to jeopardize these achievements, it is not only a
‘selective clean-up’ conducted by the judiciary that is necessary. The
situation also, and above all, requires the establishment and the
protagonism of new and more vigorous popular political
organizations able to carry forward the process of democratization
and make further progress, especially in the field of the socialization
of political and economic power and in the creation of a national
State of a popular character. In this audacious and higher political
venture, aware that the freedom that makes democracy possible is
the same that threatens it constantly, it will be more and more
necessary to learn how to engage in combat in a society
characterized by complex “relations of forces” (QC 13, § 17, pp.
1578-1589; SPN, pp. 175-185), in which the “siege is reciprocal”, by
sophisticated
ideological
instruments
that
feature
an
“unprecedented concentration of hegemony” (QC 6, §138, p. 802;
PN Vol. III, p. 109). Since this is not a conjunctural crisis, but an
“organic” and long-term global one that “cannot be overcome
except by creating a new structure” (QC 14, § 57, p. 1716; FSPN, p.
224), the “struggle for hegemony” will only be possible with strong
organizations of popular collective subjects, prepared for a wide
and capillary “war of position”, that is “compact, difficult, requiring
exceptional abilities of patience and inventiveness” (QC 6 § 138, p.
802; PN Vol. III, p. 109), a war that is able to create an irreplaceable
and permanent education for self-government, without which
“some form of Bonapartism will emerge” (QC 1, § 158, p. 139; PN
Vol. I, p. 236).
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